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Abstract—Solutions that allow the computation of arbitrary
operations over data securely in the cloud are currently im-
practical. The holy grail of cryptography, fully homomorphic
encryption, still requires minutes to compute a single operation.
In order to provide a practical solution, this paper proposes
taking a different approach to the problem of securely processing
data. FRagmenting Individual Bits (FRIBs), a scheme which
preserves user privacy by distributing bit fragments across many
locations, is presented. Privacy is maintained by each server
only receiving a small portion of the actual data, and solving
for the rest results in a vast number of possibilities. Functions
are defined with NAND logic gates, and are computed quickly
as the performance overhead is shifted from computation to
network latency. This paper details our proof of concept addition
algorithm which took 346ms to add two 32-bit values - paving
the way towards further improvements to get computations
completed under 100ms.
Index Terms—homomorphic encoding; secure processing; en-
cryption; distribution; data privacy; cloud computing;
I. INTRODUCTION
The necessity to process data securely has been been dis-
cussed for decades [1], and has become even more crucial with
our dependence on the cloud [2]. Services such as Dropbox [3]
encrypt users data and manage the keys themselves. But
malicious hackers may break the key management system,
and rogue employees of the cloud service can easily view the
data [4]. Dropbox was actually hosted on another third-party
cloud service provider [5], meaning two sets of employees
have potential access to user data.
On the other hand, privacy-focused storage companies such
as Mega Limited [6] ask end users to encrypt all data them-
selves before uploading it to the cloud, rendering it unreadable.
This guarantees strong security and privacy, but means that
the cloud service cannot provide much functionality. In order
to combine the features of Dropbox and Mega, we need to be
able to protect data, while retaining the ability to compute over
it. Fully homomorphic encryption [7] has been the proposed
solution to this problem for years now, however is yet to be
made practical. Performance figures in Section II show that it
still takes minutes for a single operation.
The FRagmenting Individual Bits (FRIBs) scheme, has
been designed to distribute each individual bit across many
service providers, while still allowing Negative-AND (NAND)
operations to be computed. We likened our proposed idea to
the New Zealand terminology of ‘fribs’, which are small pieces
of unwanted wool removed after shearing. If we say a “bit”
is the woollen fleece, then it cannot be recreated without all
the fribs and wool. Distributing the bit fragments can be seen
as exporting the fribs and wool to different locations, known
as fragment servers. Once exported, the bit fragments can be
processed securely, by building functions from NAND gates.
This is further described in Sections III, IV and V. The
implementation and practicality of FRIBs is presented in
Section VI, and shows a performance increase over fully
homomorphic encryption. FRIBs protects users data and pri-
vacy because each fragment server only gets a small portion
of the data. We further evaluate the security provided by
FRIBs in Section VII, and provide examples for additional
security in Section VIII. To show that FRIBs can be applied
to many different applications, we discuss a few use cases in
Section IX, comparing to the current state-of-the-art solution.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption exists in 2 flavours: Partially
Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) and Fully Homomorphic En-
cryption (FHE). PHE supports a single operation, for example,
addition or multiplication. Where FHE can support many
operations computed over encrypted data.
Cryptographic schemes supporting single homomorphic
operations have been around since RSA was proposed
in 1978 [8]. For some applications, only one operation
is required, and in these cases PHE is an ideal solu-
tion [9][10][11][12]. However many applications need mul-
tiple operations, and must therefore use FHE.
FHE was only proven plausible by Gentry as late as
2009 [13], many years after PHE. Wang et. al. [14] showed
performance results of a revised FHE scheme by Gentry
and Halevi [15] in 2015 for the recrypt function. CPU and
GPU implementations took 17.8 seconds and 1.32 seconds
respectively, using a small dimension size of 2048 [14]. A
medium dimension size of 8192 took 96.3 seconds and 8.4
seconds for the same function [14].
Currently hardware implementations [16] of FHE schemes
cannot give practical processing times, so it will be difficult
to make this technology usable in the real world. Combined
with the fact that quantum computing is making huge advance-
ments [17][18], having data protected by traditional encryption
schemes (for example RSA [8], Diffie-Hellman [19] and
elliptic curves [20]) may not be as feasible in the future as
it is today. Lattice-based encryption [13] could be a solution;
however, it will result in even larger key sizes than current
impractical FHE schemes.
B. Hardware Solutions
The state-of-the-art secure processor, AEGIS [21], was
designed to only reveal the data inside the processor. Therefore
any data leaving the processor is encrypted. This protects
against a range of software and physical attacks. But AEGIS
still has security vulnerabilities in the form of side-channel-
attacks [22][23]. This attack vector analyses information
“leaked” from the physical execution of a program, for exam-
ple power consumption [24] or electromagnetic radiation [25].
Other limitations of secure processors are the practicality of
deployment in the cloud. By definition, the cloud should be
flexible and adaptive, often viewed as abstracting services from
products [2], but by creating services reliant on custom hard-
ware, we lose the core essence of what the cloud should be.
C. Distribution
Cloud providers distribute their services for features like
lower latency, load-balancing, and redundancy [26][27]. Dis-
tribution can also provide better security and data protection by
distributing user data over many servers, for example splitting
database columns [28]. Then if a server is compromised,
only some of the data is lost. Some PHE schemes have
threshold variants which allow decryption to be split across
many servers [29], and have primarily been used for voting
schemes [30][9][12]. This provides extra protection to the
decryption key, as each server only possesses a part of it. This
is similar to encrypting data, as the time required to break
the encryption can be compared to time required to break into
all servers. Therefore distribution can enhance security, not
just give better performance, which is the traditional school
of thought.
D. Homomorphic Encoding
Encoding in general has been homomorphic for a while,
audio and video being only a few examples. However it has
not been readily explored for processing data securely. In 2015
we proposed Bin Encoding [31], a lossy encoding technique
for securely searching strings. This showed that encoding can
process data in a secure manner, while providing additional
functionality over the likes of homomorphic encryption. It can
also take advantage of the security given by distributing the
data across many service providers.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Given how impractical FHE is currently, we have taken a
different approach to the concept of processing data securely.
Following on from our previous work [31], we propose encod-










Fig. 1. System Model with 3 Fragment Servers and 1 Reduction Server.
A. System Model
Our scheme is aimed at all cloud users, personal and
enterprise. Figure 1 shows a typical use case for a personal
user. Bob is recording his health data (heart beat or sleep
patterns) collected from a activity tracker. He wants to store
this data in the cloud, but does not want his data shared with
third parties. Therefore Bob needs his data protected, but still
wants the ability to compute over the data, to find his average
sleep durations for example.
As the data is being uploaded, each bit is split into frag-
ments: F0, F1 and F2 in Figure 1. Each fragment is protected
using public-key encryption and sent to a seperate fragment
server managed by different cloud providers. When these
fragments are stored on the servers, they are encrypted using a
user unique key (managed by the cloud). Each fragment server
has less than 1/3 of the data (explained further in Section IV),
therefore Bob’s data is kept private.
Fragment servers can perform NAND operations, allowing
for arbitrary algorithms to be computed over Bob’s health
data. As operations are computed, the fragments will grow
in size. Then at a pre-determined stage, these fragments must
be reduced in size. The fragment servers apply a hash function
with a user defined salt value. The hash values are sent to a
reduction server, which has a lookup table previously uploaded
by Bob, as shown in Figure 1. The lookup table contains
encrypted fragments for each fragment server. Once a fragment
is reduced, more operations can be computed. Then Bob can be
securely sent all the result fragments to decode the result value.
B. Design Goals
The proposed scheme meets the following design goals.
• Support for all operations. We designed our scheme to
support many operations, including conditional functions,
by implementing a NAND gate.
• No single server can reveal the full data. To protect
privacy, each server should not be able to decode any
value (for example a 32-bit integer).
• Full cloud service. The scheme should be easy to
implement on current cloud infrastructure, for example
Amazon AWS [32] or Microsoft Azure [33], and not
require any special hardware or equipment.
• Practical Performance. Our scheme should be usable,
allowing todays users of the cloud to be protected, while
still getting computational functionality.
C. Threat Model
The threat model against which we evaluate our method
is based on the following assumptions: 1) the communication
channel between each fragment server, the reduction server,
and the client is secure; 2) each server encrypts user data
before storing it to disk; 3) each fragment server has no
knowledge on other fragment servers, and 4) data is stored
across multiple cloud service providers.
Based on these assumptions, there are two types of attacker
to evaluate FRIBs against: a malicious insider, and a mali-
cious user/outsider. Both present similar threats, however a
malicious insider has an advantage because they already have
access to one cloud service providers system. If a malicious
insider manages to bypass all internal security, for example
access polices and permissions, then they can discover 1/(2N)
of the data. Now they become the same as any other malicious
user, as they can try to break into all the other cloud service
providers. The other option is to try and break the single
set of fragments. This summaries into two attack vectors:
breaking the data with one set of fragments, and getting all
the fragments from each system.
IV. FRAGMENTING INDIVIDUAL BITS
In the proposed scheme, data privacy is achieved by frag-
menting individual bits, where the fragments are spread across
many service providers and locations. Only when the frag-
ments are combined, can the bit value be decoded. This follows
the same principle of a Threshold cryptosystem [29], which
has N entities, but only requires t entities to decrypt a value
(where t < N ). Therefore if t entities are compromised, then
the encrypted data is no longer protected.
Given a value {0, 1} or {low, high}, the AND function is
used to encode/fragment the bit (why the AND function is used
instead of NAND is explained in Section V-B). An example is
shown in Table I where a value is encoded into two fragments.
A potential problem with this example is that 50% of the
fragments are 0. Assuming an equal probability (50 : 50)
between high and low bits before encoding, each servers can
solve ≈ 1/3 of the bit values (using the fact that 1/2 are low,
and 2/3s of the fragments are 0 for low values). Depending
on requirements this could be seen as too much information
leakage, even though complete values (32-bit integers or 8-bit
characters for example) are still unknown.
One technique to reduce the number of 0 fragments is to
introduce more fragment states. Table II gives an example of
three states for two servers, resulting in 1/3 of the fragments
equalling 0. The fragmentation used in Table II is F0 ∧ F1,
where the value 2 is low unless the other fragment is high. Now
each server can only solve ≈ 1/4 of the bit values. However






















FRAGMENTATION WITH ONLY ONE SERVER RECEIVING 0.
Value F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
low 0 1 1 1 1
low 1 0 1 1 1
low 1 1 0 1 1
low 1 1 1 0 1
low 1 1 1 1 0
high 1 1 1 1 1
only allow one fragment to be 0 for an encoding, as shown in
Table III. This results in only 1/(N+1) fragments equalling 0,
where N is the number of fragments, and a server only having
knowledge of 1/(2N) of the bit values.
V. DISTRIBUTED NAND GATE
A. Operation
Now that the bits have been fragmented, we need to be
able to compute basic operations over them such as addition
and multiplication. Fragmenting values for either an addition
or multiplication is trivial. For example if we have two num-
bers, 12 and 10, we can fragment them into (6, 6) and (8, 2)
respectively. Adding the fragments together gives (14, 8),
which when joined together results in 22. Multiplication is
similar, with the fragments (3, 4) and (2, 5), multiplication
gives (6, 20), outputting 120. The challenge is being able to
compute both operations on the same set of data.
In order to compute many types of operations while only
implementing a single function, a universal logic gate is used.
FRIBs implements a NAND gate, as they are preferred over
NOR gates in electrical applications [34]. Unlike the addition
or multiplication example, the result of a NAND function is
dependant on the other fragments. Equation 1 compares the
Exclusive-OR (XOR) and NAND functions, where the NAND
function gives the wrong result. Therefore FRIBs maintains
state so that when joining the fragments together, the correct
result is given.
F0 F1 Result
A 0 ⊕ 0 0
⊕ ⊕ ⊕
B 1 ⊕ 1 0
1 ⊕ 1 0
F0 F1 Result
A 0 Z 0 1
Z Z Z
B 1 Z 1 0
1 Z 1 ?
(1)
B. Maintaining State
To keep the states of each operation we use a simple
technique of concatenating each fragment together to be com-
puted/reduced later. The first operation with both fragments
of 1, will be concatenated to 11. If we continued concatenating
we would lose the order of NAND operations, as demonstrated
in Equations 2 and 3 where the same fragment values give
different results.
F0 F1 Result
A 11 ∧ 1 1
Z Z Z
B 11 ∧ 1 1
1111 ∧ 11 0
F0 F1 Result
A 1111 ∧ 11 0
Z Z Z
B 11 ∧ 1111 0
111111 ∧ 111111 1
(2)
F0 F1 Result
A 11 ∧ 11 0
Z Z Z
B 1 ∧ 1 1
111 ∧ 111 1
F0 F1 Result
A 111 ∧ 111 1
Z Z Z
B 111 ∧ 111 1
111111 ∧ 111111 0
(3)
Since anything NANDed with 0 results in 1, FRIBs uses 0 to
maintain order. This is why the fragmentation is currently done
with the AND function, so that if a server has a 0, it knows the
bit value is low. Equations 4 and 5 give the same examples as
in Equations 2 and 3, but now maintains order. Equation 4 now
gives the right fragment value of 11011011 instead of 111111,
which represents 11 Z (11 Z 11). But the left fragment value
of 110110011 has an extra 0, giving (11Z11)Z11 as the order
is different to the right side. The second example in Equation 5
is more straightforward, as both sides are the same.
F0 F1 Result
A 11 ∧ 1 1
Z Z Z
B 11 ∧ 1 1
11011 ∧ 11 0
F0 F1 Result
A 11011 ∧ 11 0
Z Z Z
B 11 ∧ 11011 0
110110011 ∧ 11011011 1
(4)
F0 F1 Result
A 11 ∧ 11 0
Z Z Z
B 1 ∧ 1 1
1101 ∧ 1101 1
F0 F1 Result
A 1101 ∧ 1101 1
Z Z Z
B 1101 ∧ 1101 1
1101001101 ∧ 1101001101 0
(5)
C. Reduction
Reducing the size of a fragment requires information about
all fragments. A seperate server, known as the reduction server,
is used where all N servers send their fragments to during the
reduction step. Once it has received each fragment, it uses a
lookup table to retrieve the reduced fragments for each server.
However if each fragment was sent to and returned from the
reduction server in the current format, then some of the data
can be decoded. The reduction servers have no knowledge of
the program being run over the data, meaning any bits they
can decode may still be worthless.
Since the reduction server is performing a simple lookup,
we can obfuscate each fragment state to a unique value.














Fig. 2. NAND Gate Full Adder
server unique salt value, or use a random mapping. Now the
reduction server cannot know the state of the fragments it has
received, but protecting the reduced fragments is slightly more
difficult. Instead of using a hash algorithm, we use public-
key encryption on each reduced fragment, such that only the
single server can decrypt the fragment. The lookup table is
built offline and sent to the reduction server. Therefore the
reduction server only receives a protected lookup table, and all
the reduced fragments are already encrypted. Another security
benefit given by this is that each public key for the individual
servers and their reduced fragments, can remain private. To
further improve privacy, multiple reduction servers can be used
were each one is used in a pseudo-random order.
With a maximum fragment size of 32-bits, it produces >
30000 entries per server. Using just two servers creates a very
large multi-key lookup table. Reducing the fragment size to
two sets of 16-bits for the lookup table, gives < 200 entries
per server. This makes implementation more practical as the
lookup table is now of a feasible size. With a maximum of <
200 entries per server, each key only requires 8-bits, which
can be increased by a few bits for better hashing. Splitting
a fragment into two 16-bit values must be done at the last
operation. For example, 110110011011000110110011011 will
become 110110011011 and 110110011011, allowing the same
lookup table to be used to get two obfuscated values. Another
lookup table can then get the encrypted values for each server
using the two obfuscated values.
By using the same lookup table many times, we can
increase the number of operations before the fragments need
to be reduced, if the fragments have the available space to
grow. Meaning that 110110011011 and 110110011011 can
become four 16-bit values 110110011011, 110110011011,
110110011011 and 110110011011. Given that more servers
lead to larger lookup tables, the size of the keys may need
to reduced even further. Finding the balance between number
of reductions and size of the fragments is important for
performance, as described in Section VI-D.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROVEN PRACTICALITY
A. Addition
The addition of two 32-bit integers can be achieved with
thirty one full-adders and a single half-adder. A full-adder
comprised of NAND gates can be seen in Figure 2. In order
to get the best performance for our proposed scheme, we
must reduce the number of network requests required by
combining many reductions requests into a single request. First
we compute all values for N4, which for worst-case where Ai
and Bi are both 1, gives 10111001101. The fragment therefore
can grow up to 10-bits during this step. We can then combine
all 32 fragments for N4 into a single network payload and
send them to be reduced to single bits.
How the carry bits are reduced can vary depending on
implementation, however we will allow the fragments to grow
as large as needed for this step. If a limitation is applied, more
reduction requests will be needed. Because the first bit does
not have an input carry value, N9 input is N1 and N1 (equates
to !N1). The other carry bits involve gates N1, N4, N5 and
N9, where the result from N9 is connected to the next bits N5
gate. Given that N4 will be a single bit, and that the worse
case value for N1 is 11, each carry step will at most add 5-
bits to the fragment (11010). We only need a single 0 between
each operation because we know the order is continuous. For
example if the carry output for the second bit is 1101011011,
we know the order of operations is (110(10(110(11)))).
This results in a worse-case fragment size of 155-bits (16×
10-bit values). We then send these carry-bit fragments to be
reduced, meaning we now have single bit values for all N4
and N9 gates. Allowing us to compute all N8 gates with a
maximum fragment size of 10-bits again. This only totals three
reduction requests.
B. Multiplication
Binary multiplication can be thought of as a series of AND
operations, all added together. Equation 6 shows an example
of multiplying 5 and 11 on an 8-bit machine. For each bit
in 11, we AND it with each bit in 5, giving 8 values. Adding













To make the additions more efficient, we add together the
biggest and next biggest values together, then the next pairing,
down to the smallest and second smallest. This is shown in
Equation 7.
00000101 0000 000000 00
+ 0000101 + 000 + 00101 + 0
00001111 0000 001010 00
(7)
We repeat this step in Equation 8.
00001111 0000
+ 001010 + 00
00110111 0000
(8)
And the final addition gives us the result in Equation 9.
00110111
+ 0000
00110111 ∴ = 00110111
(9)
This gives a total of 7 addition operations for this example.
But by adding similar sized numbers together in parallel,
we decrease the number of reduction steps required. For
Equation 7, each addition can combine the reduction requests
into one, meaning the performance is close to that of a single
addition. Therefore the performance of this example will be
slightly above 3 additions. For 32-bit values, there are a total
of 31 additions, but it performs like 5 additions.
C. Conditional
Supporting an operation to compare two values can dra-
matically affect the security of a secure processing scheme.
For example if a group of cipher values only encrypted the
set {0, 1}, then the ability to calculate if two cipher values are
equal will result in two subgroups of cipher values. Where
one subgroup must contain either encrypt a 0 or 1, and the
other subgroup must encrypt the opposite. However because
our proposed scheme has the bits fragmented across many
servers, all the servers must compute over the same instruction
set. This prevents a compromised sever trying to compare all
the fragments it has, as the other fragment servers would need
to be doing the same malicious action. Therefore our scheme
has the ability to support conditional operations, which can
be implemented to return the result in either a secure or non-
secure manner.
1) Secure Results: Returning results securely, means the
result is a fragmented bit, where < 1 fragment server has
knowledge of the result. This can make some programs
difficult to implement as the result of the comparison is not
known. Two examples are given in Algorithms 1 and 2, for
an equal and greater than or equal if statement. For both
examples, we have to increment c without knowing the result
of the comparison.
Algorithm 1 If Equals Example
1: if a = b then
2: c← c+ 1
3:
4: function IFEQUAL(a, b)
5: m← a− b
6: inout← 0
7: carry ← 0
8: for i← 0 to 32 do
9: tmp← m[i] + inout+ carry
10: inout← tmp & 1
11: carry ← tmp >> 1
12: return !(inout | carry)
13: c← c+ (1× ifEqual(a, b))
0ms 350ms175ms
Fig. 3. Network latency experienced across 9 AWS datacenter locations.
Algorithm 2 If Greater Than or Equal Example
1: if a >= b then
2: c← c+ 1
3:
4: function IFGREATEREQUAL(a, b)
5: sign neq ← a[31]ˆb[31]
6: c← a− b
7: return (!sign neq & !c[31]) | (sign neq & !a[31])
8: c← c+ (1× ifGreaterEqual(a, b))
2) Non-Secure Results: Instead of returning a fragmented
bit, this approach returns the whole bit by using a different
lookup table than for a standard operation. This allows each
server to know the result of the conditional statement, making
programs easier to design and in some cases compute faster.
D. Performance
1) Network Latency: Because FRIBs relies heavily on
reduction requests, the locations of the fragment/reduction
servers affects performance. Figure 3 shows the average la-
tency (round trip time) experienced during testing on Ama-
zon AWS free-tier virtual machines in 9 locations: Vir-
ginia, California, Oregon, Ireland, Frankfurt, Singapore, Seoul,
Tokyo and Sydney. Locations near each other had good con-
nectivity, for example Singapore, Seoul and Tokyo, or Virginia,
California and Oregon. In this test, Sydney did not perform
well, with the best results over 100ms. This is something that
needs to be considered when choosing server locations, as
countries like Australia and New Zealand do not have the same
level of connectivity as other Asia-Pacific countries [35].
2) Addition: The cloud service providers used for this
experiment were Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and
Google Cloud Platform. All instances were running with the
cheapest tier option, and based in the United States. The server
configuration was a single reduction sever and two fragment
servers. The reduction server was in California with Amazon,
a fragment server was also in California but with Microsoft,
and the final fragment server was in Iowa hosted by Google.
We used a proof-of-concept addition algorithm with a 27-
bit maximum fragment size which required 9 reductions, and
averaged 100 addition operations for 32-bit unsigned integers.
The latency at the time of testing was 3.106ms for Azure-
Amazon, and 37.414ms for Google-Amazon.
Our results produced an average of 346ms for each addition
operation. This is directionally proportional to the largest
latency time, where 37.414× 9 ≈ 346− (some small compu-
tation times). Therefore if all the fragment servers could be
within 10ms round trip from the reduction server, then addition
times could be 99.274ms. The latency figures of Azure to
Amazon could result in 37.228ms. Allowing for a larger frag-
ment size would also increase the performance. For example,
if only 5 reductions are required for an addition, then we can
nearly half the completion time. These performance numbers
are much faster than FHE schemes described in Section II-A.
3) Threading Issues: Each fragment server executes the
same instructions before a reduction is needed, and all the
fragments need to be received before the reduction server can
return the results. Ideally all the servers are running the users
thread at the same time. In reality, this cannot be guaranteed.
We tested starting 50 user threads on 2 fragment servers in
random order with a 10ms delay. Each user task computes 100
additions operations. Figure 4 shows 10% of the threads for
the first few addition operations. Each line represents the start
of an addition operation across both servers, where the color
represents a unique user task. The labeled thread starts early
on S1, but takes longer to start on S0. However the start of





Fig. 4. Thread scheduling across 2 fragment servers for 50 randomly started user jobs.
servers. This happens as each thread must wait for the other
to reach the reduction stage. Therefore, the threads are able
to line up on both servers, where the thread counts on each
are similar.
VII. SECURITY EVALUATION
Given our threat model in Section III-C, there are two main
attack vectors we need to evaluate against: breaking the data
with one set of fragments, and getting all the fragments from
each system.
A. One set of Fragments
Successful attacks on traditional cryptography can often
decrypt all the data [36][37], but with our scheme each bit
fragment must be tried for each possibly. For example, we
have two fragment servers and the bit fragments (b0−7) for a
byte known to be an ASCII value in the range of 32 − 122.
Because we only know ≈ 1/4 of the bits, there are a number
of possibilities for the value. If we know b1 and b3 to be zero,
then we have 24 possibilities, of which 14 are letters. If we
increase the number of fragment servers to four, then we might
only know one bit. Setting only b3 or b1 to zero gives 48 or 46
possibilities respectively. Once we have hundreds of ASCII
fragments, forming sentences and paragraphs, the number of
possibilities are massive (14100 ≈ 4.1 × 10114). Therefore
privacy is preserved by the large amount of computation time
to generate and test all possibilities. Note, if an attacker
manages to break into more systems, then the number of
possibilities will decrease as more bits are known.
B. Breaking into all Systems
Any service implementing our scheme is ultimately respon-
sible for the security of their own environment. Software
patching, access polices and firewall management, to name
a few examples. However some exploits are out of a cloud
services control, for example a zero-day vulnerability in their
operating system. To reduce this risk, a mixture of Linux and
Microsoft servers can be used, such that any one vulnerability
cannot exploit every server. When a user/business is choos-
ing the service providers, they should also seek information
regarding security measures in place. A common approach is
looking at a list of standards the service is compliant with.
International standards are now emerging for cloud service
providers, with ISO/IEC 27018:2014 (with ISO/IEC 27002 as
one of its normative references) being the first International
code of practice that focuses on protection of Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) in the cloud. This increases
the security of their service, while providing more trust to
their users. The cryptography recommendations/requirements
described in ISO/IEC 27018:2014 are the objectives specified
in clause 10 of ISO/IEC 27002. Examples are provided for
use of cryptography in the cloud, but at a minimum a cloud
should implement controls for confidentiality (data encrypted
when stored or transmitted), and authentication. However there
is no mention of true secure processing, like homomorphic
encryption. To try and protect data being processed, access
controls are recommended. This makes it more difficult for
rogue employees or outside attackers to gain access to data
in-flight. Therefore by conforming with ISO/IEC 27018:2014
will reduce the chance of a breach, and applying our scheme
will enhance the security already provided.
End users also have control over their security, as the more
fragment and reduction servers used, the smaller the risk of
their data being compromised. Ten servers will give more
security over five, but the running costs increase. Therefore
evaluating against this attack vector is implementation de-
pendant. FRIBs can protect data from rogue employees and
malicious users who break into a few systems, but the cloud
service providers need to try protect the fragments they store
as well.
VIII. APPLYING EXTRA SECURITY LAYERS
A. Hardware Implementation
For users/businesses requiring even more security, and are
prepared to lose the flexibility of the cloud, hardware imple-
mentations are viable. A problem with secure processors like
AEGIS [21], is they are vulnerable to side-channel-attacks
as described in Section II-B. With non-secure values, if the
hardware server is compromised, the data is compromised.
However by having the bits themselves distributed, they only
get 1/(2N) of the data required to reveal the value. Building
a hardware server for our scheme would make the attacks
physical, and therefore more difficult, especially when they
are spread around the world.
B. Public-Key Encryption
One way to further protect the fragmented data is to have
it encrypted. Note that when the data is in storage, the cloud
service provider should encrypt it as well. But the user also
has the ability to encrypt the data inside the fragments. For
example, a business needs to share data with its customers.
Each customer is sent fragments from each server in order to
decode the data. There are two methods for securely sending
the data to the customers. Each fragment server can encrypt
the actual fragments before sending them to the user, or the
data itself can be encrypted inside the fragments. The first
method requires each server to have the customers public key,
where the second method has the public key fragmented across
each server.
Having the ability to store public keys within fragments
gives them more protection. But it also means we can store
private/decryption keys in the cloud. For example, after some
data has been processed, it can encrypted within the fragments.
Then when the data is needed again, we can decrypt it.
This follows the same form of protection as described in
Section II-B for secure processors.
C. Homomorphic Encryption
Like public-key encryption, homomorphic encryption could
be applied within the fragments. This would allow encrypted
data to be processed, while being distributed. The performance
overhead of this would be large, if keys/dimensions are big.
However because the data is already protected, we could make
the keys/dimensions smaller.
IX. USE CASES AND COMPARISONS
A. Small to Medium Sized Businesses
Many companies, in particular smaller or new businesses
can benefit from the cloud, for example cost savings [38].
A problem emerges when personal customer data, or in
house private data is stored in the cloud. Customers have an
agreement with the company to store this information, but
not directly with the cloud service provider. Even though the
data would be visible to malicious employees of the cloud
service provider. These problems have stopped some business
from adopting the cloud, as they cannot guarantee the data
is protected.
Unfortunately having data 100% protected while in the
cloud is not currently possible. Even when meeting every
standard, having the correct polices in place, and using the
strongest encryption, someone, somewhere with the intent,
resources and time will break it. The best we can do is get
close to 100%. Like homomorphic encryption, FRIBs has the
flexibility to meet companies required security requirements.
However the stronger FRIBs becomes, by increasing the num-
ber of fragment and reduction servers, it still maintains similar
performance. Where with homomorphic encryption, as the
key/dimension size increases, so does the computation times.
B. Internet of Things: Low Energy and Low Powered Devices
The Internet is spreading to all of our devices, from kitchen
appliances, to autonomous cars and drones. Many of these
devices have very little computation power, and can often be
powered by a battery. The challenge is protecting the data
they collect and transmit. Traditional encryption techniques
are too inefficient, meaning security is often overlooked in
favour of functionality
Wireless sensor networks [39] are becoming widely de-
ployed [40] in commercial, military and personal environ-
ments. Schemes have been proposed to encrypt data [40][41]
efficiently on wireless sensor nodes, however the data must be
decrypted before any processing can be applied. Using FHE,
an Intel Core i7 3770K at 3.5GHz takes 1.08 seconds and 10.6
seconds for the encryption of a small and medium sized
dimension [14]. Where a sample sensor node using an Intel
StrongARM SA-1110 microprocessor, only has a frequency
of 59MHz to 206MHz [42] (relatively fast compared to other
sensor node processors). Combined with other architecture
differences, like data-path and caches sizes, the sensor node
cannot encrypt using a FHE scheme in feasible time. Where
FRIBs requires very little effort to fragment bits, and can
utilise existing encryption schemes [40][41] built for sensor
networks to send the fragments. This also reduces the amount
of data the nodes have to send, as FHE can produce large
cipher-values.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper has described FRIBs, a novel scheme to compute
arbitrary operations in the cloud while preserving user privacy.
Using a different methodology to state-of-the-art solutions,
individual bits are fragmented and spread across different
cloud service providers, rendering the values incomprehen-
sible. FRIBs follows the idea of “hiding in the masses”, as
proposed in [31], where each bit fragment has a large number
of possibilities.
One future possibility for FRIBs is to use a different tech-
nique for fragmenting the bits. This is to prevent 1/(2N) of
the data being visible to each fragment server. We would also
like to conduct a more in-depth security analysis of FRIBs,
for example observing patterns of hashes received by the
reduction server. Others include looking into secure instruc-
tion sets, improving the multiplication approach, supporting
dynamic memory lookups and more conditional statements.
Combined with increasing performance, a distributed secure
virtual processor becomes plausible.
FRIBs computes operations in a fraction of the time as
the holy grail of cryptography (i.e. fully homomorphic en-
cryption), reducing processing time from hours to seconds.
This is achieved by shifting the overhead from computation,
to network latency between each fragment server and the
reduction server/s. By allowing for varying performance and
security, users can now take control of their data in the cloud.
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[23] B. Köpf and D. Basin, “An information-theoretic model for adaptive
side-channel attacks,” in Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security. ACM, 2007, pp. 286–296.
[24] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, “Differential power analysis,” in Advances
in Cryptology—CRYPTO’99. Springer, 1999, pp. 388–397.
[25] K. Gandolfi, C. Mourtel, and F. Olivier, “Electromagnetic analysis:
Concrete results,” in Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems—
CHES 2001. Springer, 2001, pp. 251–261.
[26] A. Greenberg, J. Hamilton, D. A. Maltz, and P. Patel, “The cost of a
cloud: research problems in data center networks,” ACM SIGCOMM
computer communication review, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 68–73, 2008.
[27] G. Xu, J. Pang, and X. Fu, “A load balancing model based on cloud
partitioning for the public cloud,” Tsinghua Science and Technology,
vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 34–39, 2013.
[28] V. Ganapathy, D. Thomas, T. Feder, H. Garcia-Molina, and R. Motwani,
“Distributing data for secure database services,” in Proceedings of the
4th International Workshop on Privacy and Anonymity in the Informa-
tion Society. ACM, 2011, p. 8.
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